Blog Originally Published by Vidhi Centre for Legal Policy

The Slow Burn of Domestic Abuse 

For decades, Indian criminal law has operated on a simple premise: not every homicide is murder. Indian Penal codes draw a critical distinction between culpable homicide and murder, with the classification hinging on the degree of intent and knowledge involved. Culpable homicide, defined in Section 299 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Section 100 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), is the broader offense of causing death with the intention or knowledge that the act is likely to cause death. Murder, its more severe form under Section 300 of the IPC and Section 101 of the BNS, requires a higher degree of culpability, such as a direct intention to kill or knowledge that the act is so imminently dangerous it must in all probability cause death. An act of culpable homicide becomes murder if it meets these stricter criteria, unless it falls under specific exceptions. The most prominent of these is Exception 1 to Section 300 IPC (mirrored in BNS Section 101), which reduces murder to culpable homicide if the act was committed due to “grave and sudden provocation” that deprived the offender of self-control. The exception acknowledges that when a person is deprived of this self-control due to such provocation, their culpability is lessened because the act is not seen as premeditated, but as a result of an overwhelming, momentary passion. Therefore, the law, in theory, acknowledges that even the most reasonable person can snap when pushed to the brink. 

But what if that breaking point isn’t the result of a single, explosive incident? What if it’s the outcome of years of humiliation, violence, or psychological torment—a slow, corrosive drip rather than a sudden flood? For many women in India, particularly those trapped in abusive marriages, this is not a hypothetical. It is their lived reality.

The Law’s Blind Spot: Suddenness Over Sustained Suffering 

The traditional legal framework for grave and sudden provocation, shaped by cases like R v. Mawgridge and K.M. Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra, insists on immediacy. The accused must lose self-control in the heat of the moment; any delay is seen as evidence of premeditation, not provocation. This approach, however, has been critiqued by scholars like Dr. K.D. Gaur for its “rigidity and lack of sensitivity to the realities of prolonged abuse,” especially in domestic contexts.  

The English case of R v. Ahluwalia brought this issue into sharp focus across commonwealth jurisprudence, especially evoking discourse across the Indian subcontinent where such domestic abuse is unfortunately ever present. Kiranjit Ahluwalia, after years of domestic violence, killed her husband in an act of desperation. The courts initially struggled to fit her experience into the “sudden” provocation mould. After her initial murder conviction and life sentence, Ahluwalia’s conviction was overturned due to inadequate legal representation. On retrial, her plea of provocation was rejected for lack of sudden loss of control, but she was ultimately convicted of voluntary manslaughter based on new psychiatric evidence supporting diminished responsibility under the Homicide Act 1957. Indian law, too, has been slow to adapt, often failing to recognize what psychologists call the “slow burn” effect of cumulative abuse. 

The Numbers Don’t Lie: Domestic Abuse Is Widespread 

The scale of the problem is staggering. According to the National Family Health Survey (NFHS-5, 2019–21), nearly one in three (31%) ever-married women in India aged 18–49 have experienced domestic violence. About 29% have faced physical or sexual violence by their spouse, and 25% have suffered serious injuries. Emotional abuse is common too, with 12% reporting humiliation, threats, or insults from their husbands. In some states, the numbers are even higher—Karnataka and Uttar Pradesh report spousal violence rates of 44% and 36%, respectively. 

These figures likely understate the problem. It is estimated from NFHS data that a staggering 86% of married women who experience violence never seek help. Stigma, fear, and lack of support keep most survivors silent. The consequences are devastating: higher rates of depression, PTSD, suicide attempts, and chronic health problems. Thus for many, the law’s insistence on “sudden” provocation is not just irrelevant, it is a denial of their lived experience. 

Courts Respond– A Shift Towards a Doctrine of Sustained Provocation 

Indian courts have slowly started to fill this gap. The courts have judicially created a defense for “battered women” by acknowledging that persistent domestic violence can constitute sustained provocation, as established in the landmark Manju Lakra v. State of Assam case. In this ruling, the court recognized the “Nallathangal syndrome“—the Indian equivalent of Battered Woman Syndrome—to explain the severe psychological impact of long-term abuse. The creation of this defense allows the judiciary to view a homicide committed by a “battered woman” not as murder, but as the lesser offense of culpable homicide, thereby setting aside the most severe charges in recognition of her prolonged suffering. Moreover, the greater doctrine of “sustained provocation”, which is currently just a judicially created caveat read into the exception of grave and sudden provocation, is in the process of being refined by the courts.  

In Perumal v. State, the Madras High Court recognised that a husband, after enduring ongoing infidelity and emotional abuse, acted under “sustained provocation” when he killed his wife. The court acknowledged that provocation can accumulate over time, ultimately resulting in a breaking point. 

Similarly, in Marimuthu v. State, the High Court observed that incidents may “linger” in the accused’s mind, “torment him continuously” and, at one point, “erupt, making him lose self-control.” The Supreme Court finally validated this standard in Dauvaram Nirmalkar v. State of Chhattisgarh, stating: “The gravity of the provocation can be assessed by taking into account the history of abuse and need not be confined to the gravity of the final provocative act.” Yet, without formal codification, the application of this doctrine remains inconsistent—a judicial patchwork rather than a clear rule. 

When the Law Refuses to Bend: The Case of B.D. Khunte 

The limitations of India’s traditional provocation doctrine are starkly illustrated in B.D. Khunte v. Union of India (2015). In this case, a soldier endured repeated sexual abuse and humiliation at the hands of his superior officer. Hours after being raped, Khunte shot and killed his assailant. Despite strong corroborative evidence of ongoing abuse, the court found him guilty of murder, citing the “cooling-off period” principle from the K.M. Nanavati judgment, rejecting his plea of grave and sudden provocation. The court reasoned that the time elapsed between the assault and the killing was sufficient for Khunte to regain self-control, thereby disqualifying him from the exception. 

This judgment exposes the rigidity of the existing legal standard and raises a pressing moral question: Should a person subjected to prolonged torment be judged by the same standards as one who kills with premeditation and pure malice? In a context where abuse is inflicted by a superior at the workplace, a dynamic many would consider sufficient provocation for a loss of control, the law’s insistence on immediacy may perpetuate injustice rather than prevent it. The Khunte case, therefore, highlights the urgent need for a doctrine that accommodates the realities of sustained provocation, particularly for victims of long-term mistreatment who do not, or cannot, react instantaneously. 

Comparative Lessons: The World Moves Forward 

India is not alone in facing these questions. The UK, through the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, now allows for “loss of control” defences based on cumulative provocation, as seen in R v. Ahluwalia. The US increasingly recognizes battered woman syndrome as a basis for the “heat of passion” defence, though application varies by state. 

Australia’s R v Chhay is particularly instructive. The court there recognized that loss of self-control need not immediately follow the provocative act, especially in cases of cyclical violence. Chief Justice Gleeson wrote that the law “denies that the killing need follow immediately upon the provocative act or conduct of the deceased.” This “slow burn” understanding has influenced Indian courts and scholars, making space for the realities of sustained abuse. 

Criminal Codes Change: Domestic Abuse Does Not 

Just two months ago, a case reflecting the culmination of abuse and torment resulting in a woman striking her partner fatally, made it to the front page of the Times of India website. Amasso Bai stated her husband frequently accused her of infidelity, forced her into “unnatural sexual acts”, and was regularly physically abusive. One night after an argument, he followed her and tried to strangle her. She pushed him, causing him to fall, and then smashed his head multiple times with a stone. Amasso Bai confessed and was arrested and charged with murder. Police noted that the crime was a “tragic outcome of sustained violence,” but the judicial outcome regarding a provocation defense is pending investigation. Amasso Bai represents thousands, if not millions, of women in the same predicament. Despite the development of the aforementioned “Nallathangal syndrome” defense, and the Police’s poignant description of the killing as a tragic outcome of sustained violence, there is still uncertainty about the conviction Amasso will ultimately face.  

The Gendered Legal Standard

The previously mentioned cases of Perumal v. State and Marimuthu v. State, which established sustained provocation as a part of the grave and sudden provocation exception to murder, share an irking similarity: in both cases men who faced infidelity and “emotional abuse” at the hands of their partners were told their struggles constituted sustained provocation. Their pain was seen, heard and validated by the courts. As Aishwarya Deb notes in the NUJS law review, “Feminist scholars have thoroughly criticized the traditional provocation doctrine as being sympathetic towards jealous men who engage in brutal domestic killings while the underlying factors disproportionately burden abused women who kill.”  

Whether it is the reasonable man’s test –which, despite the gendered verbiage, is argued by judges to be legally akin to an objective reasonable persons test– or the need to establish an immediate act of provocation preceding the killing, both of these key tenets of the sustained provocation defense (as ratified by the Supreme Court in Dauvaram Nirmalkar v. State of Chhattisgarh) disadvantage female victims of longstanding domestic abuse who finally strike back. Deb notes that when the reasonable man’s test is used by “Courts to evaluate the social circumstances under which a woman resorted to violence, it inevitably relies upon a male understanding of the situation and results in reinforcing stereotypes about women who kill”. Furthermore, insistence on immediacy, albeit for the sake of ruling out premeditation, disadvantages women as “The ‘loss of self-control’ and ‘suddenness’ requirements make it difficult for women to prove provocation, especially when they kill in non-confrontational scenarios” after a buildup of untenable abuse.  

The Path Forward

Both from the data at hand and the numerous cases analogous to Ammaso Bai’s floating across print media –where justice is not guaranteed for victims of abuse who reach a breaking point—it is clear that the acknowledgement of the ‘Nallathangal syndrome’ and the current implementation of the sustained provocation defense developed by the courts remain incomplete. One may be wondering what more the courts can do? I believe the way forward is both legislative and judicial. The current understandings of both the Nallathangal syndrome and sustained provocation must be explicitly mentioned in the BNS, as opposed to being read in. Today, despite the Supreme Court’s recognition of sustained provocation’s validity as an extension of exception 1 in 2023, many lower courts are yet to even learn of the caveat, let alone understand the reasoning behind it. It is difficult to expect widespread implementation when widespread coverage is yet to exist. 

In considering legislative reforms, the UK’s Coroners and Justice Act, 2009, offers instructive examples relevant to the treatment of Battered Woman Syndrome (BWS) within the law of provocation. Section 55 of the Act broadens the grounds for a provocation defense by introducing “qualifying triggers,” including instances where words or conduct create circumstances of an extremely grave nature and provoke a justifiable sense of being seriously “wronged”. Reflecting the recommendations of the English Law Commission, the act includes “fear of violence” as a trigger, deliberately recognizing the recurring cycle of abuse in domestic violence cases and acknowledging how women may perceive ongoing threats even in the absence of immediate violence. Additional changes have attempted to further reduce gender bias in the law, such as eliminating requirements for “suddenness” in the loss of self-control and removing sexual infidelity as an automatic trigger.   

Drawing from these advances, Indian legislators might consider parallel reforms. One potential amendment to Exception 1 of Section 300 of the IPC (Section 101 BNS) could be the insertion of an explanation clarifying:

 “For the purposes of this exception, if it is established that the accused endured repeated and prolonged physical or psychological abuse, the entire history of such mistreatment may be understood as constituting a period of provocation.”

The lengthy legislative process to implement such an amendment is a small administrative price to pay so that cases like Amasso Bai’s don’t merely remain a “tragic outcome of sustained violence”.

Justice is not always sudden, and neither is the suffering that sometimes leads to it.